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Refracting ritual: 
An Upside-down Perspective on Ritual, Media and Conflict 
 
Michael Houseman (Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris) 
 
 (in Ritual, Media and Conflict, R. L. Grimes, U. Husken, U. Simon and E. Venbrux (eds), Oxford: OUP, 2011) 
 
 
The contributors to this volume have gone out of their way to make their intellectual lives 
difficult. In tackling the interplay of ritual, media and conflict, they have taken on a 
humanities equivalent of the unresolved “three body problem” in celestial mechanics: how to 
compute the mutual gravitational interaction of three masses. Getting a grasp on the ritual-
media-conflict question, however, is complicated in a typically terrestrial, social sciences 
way. The bodies in question, far from being well-defined physical objects, are conceptual 
constructs, derived from the analysis of empirical events whose very nature is subject to 
debate. In the course of the project’s history the contributors entertained a wealth of partially 
contradictory propositions and queries: “Ritual resolves conflict.” “Ritual disguises conflict, 
thereby amplifying it.” “Mediatizing conflict spreads it.” “If mediatization escalates, does 
ritualization follow suit, or does ritualization decline?” “When ritual and media interact, how 
do the patterns of conflict change?” Such questions attest to the novelty and far-reaching 
character of their joint adventure but also to the conceptual difficulties it involves.  
 It is hardly surprising that Grimes’ generous, even-handed introduction is largely 
devoted to unpacking the complex issues raised by these alternative touchstone statements, so 
as to better stake out a middle ground between improvable generalities and ethnographic 
truisms. While tracing the project’s collaborative history, he is mainly concerned with making 
explicit some of the authors’ shared presuppositions regarding ritual, media, conflict, and the 
connections among them. The contributors are less preoccupied with identifying the 
boundaries of these concepts than in describing their interrelationships. However, as Grimes 
recognizes, definitional issues can not simply be ignored, and addressing them will allow me 
to add my own two cents to the mix (“We’re not just looking for polite words” was Grimes’ 
admonition when inviting me to write this afterword). 
 
Conflict 
 
“Conflict” plays a somewhat special, all-encompassing role in this collection. It is at once the 
most pervasive and least conceptualized of the title’s three terms. Dispute intervenes mostly 
as a context, as the regrettable yet recurrent state of affairs providing empirical situations in 
which ritual and media come into play. Precipitated or acted upon by one or the other or both, 
conflict’s own distinctive properties remain largely unexamined. In short, conflict in these 
contributions intervenes more as a backdrop than as a “body.” 
 One partial exception is described in the introduction and appears in several of the 
essays. A model of conflict advanced by sociologist Philip Smith holds that the essence of 
violent dispute (war being the prime example) is ritual, conceived as the source of an 
unquestionable polarization that sets a positively connoted “us” in opposition to a negatively 
weighted “them.” As Grimes remarks, this view relies on an overly narrow understanding of 
ritual as “the mobilization of cultural symbols in the service of a sacralized we/they dualism.” 
Alternatively, it implies an abusively comprehensive understanding of ritual as equivalent to 
symbolic practice in general. Following Gregory Bateson, for example, one might argue 
instead that polarization is an intrinsic, potentiating feature not of ritual but of conflict. From 
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this standpoint, one should expect the discursive, iconic, and enacted representations called 
upon to advocate and justify the escalation of dispute, to make ample use of conflict’s 
tendency to give rise to polar opposites. Such representations may include ritual events, but 
this is not necessarily the case. Thus, when Smith speaks of ritual (as opposed to instrumental) 
motivations for fighting, I would say that he is really speaking of something much broader, 
namely symbolism.  
 While the idea that symbolic polarizations are necessarily instances of ritual is highly 
debatable, it does have the merit of underscoring the fact that conflict and ritual are in no way 
antithetical. Indeed, one of the originalities of this collection is its insistence, “We do not 
assume that conflict is necessarily bad any more than we assume that ritual is always good.” 
Thus, while recognizing that “ritual may be a means for peace-making,” the contributors have 
chosen to concentrate “on ritual as a factor in conflict rather than as a means for resolving it.”  
 Old ideas die hard, however, and many of the papers’ analyses are implicitly built on 
the idea that conflicts are better resolved and that ritual has a role to play in this process. This 
important issue deserves clarification. The distinctive efficacy of ritual does not reside in its 
ability to provide answers to problems raised by social life. At best, it recontextualizes 
particular predicaments in a way that allows answers to be sought more easily elsewhere, by 
means of the myriad resources humans have at their disposable: intimidation, seduction, 
logical reasoning, secrecy, story-telling, negotiation, bluff, and so forth. On the other hand, 
ritual is particularly apt at transmitting certain fundamental questions in the light of which 
social life, including the problems it entails, may be defined. Ritual does not so much clarify 
identities or set things straight as it perpetuates, in a way that makes them particularly difficult 
to deny, the mysteries and unresolved issues that we hold dear. In other words and stated 
more positively, ritual promotes the ongoing relevance of certain axiomatic cultural values 
and ideas by packaging them, along with their attendant ambiguities and contradictions, in the 
form of somewhat enigmatic, yet highly memorable, enactments that are hard to argue with. 
Thus, while rituals are often occasioned by disputes or precipitated by transformative events 
in which unsettled concerns come to the fore, they remain decidedly ambivalent with respect 
to the resolution of these issues. Although they act to redefine particular contentions, at the 
same time, they corroborate and sustain the conceptual and relational grounds from which 
these contentions arise. In this way, ritual does somewhat less than what we might like to 
believe. However, what it does do, it does better than most anything else: provide an 
authoritative basis for the establishment, persistence, and incremental transformation of 
traditions geared to the organization of embodied action.  
 It is worth stressing that there are at least two clear advantages to having chosen 
conflict as a field of investigation. The first is that it anchors academic speculations regarding 
ritual and media to immediate, widely shared pragmatic concerns. The second is that it 
simplifies analysis in a realistic rather than purely logical fashion, thereby paving the way for 
fruitful comparison. Because of conflict’s polarizing tendencies, the widely varying case 
studies can be easily grasped as organized around issues having essentially two sides. 
 
Ritual and Ritualization 
 
In arguing for the specificity of ritual as a particular mode of symbolic practice with 
distinctive potency, I come up against what is perhaps the key concept in many of these 
papers: ritualization. Indeed, the contributors speak of “ritual” but mostly of “ritualization,” 
thereby focussing attention on how events may be said to acquire certain ritual-like 
characteristics. This approach, as explicated by Grimes in his introduction, draws on a series 
of features that, while not definitive of ritual, are often associated with it. Ritual is deemed to 
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be, among other things, “embodied, enacted, spatially rooted, temporally bounded, prescribed, 
formalized, and repeated or singularized.” These are the qualities that are held to characterize 
ritualization. To the extent that they are present to a greater or lesser degree, a given activity 
may be said to be more or less ritualized. Thus, recapitulates Grimes, “No activity is a ritual, 
but any action can be ritualized.” From a methodological point of view, this perspective is 
both appropriate and highly productive. Much of the material presented in this volume would 
be excluded if a stricter, more static conception of ceremonial activity were adopted. To be 
able to envisage works of art, acts of public vandalism, encounters over the Internet, protest 
marches, and political torture as instances of ritualization casts them in a new, unexpected 
light, allowing certain heretofore neglected aspects of these phenomena to come to the fore. 
However, every conceptual choice worth its salt has a price to pay, and it is useful to tease out 
exactly what that price is. 
 The problem is that “ritual,” as distinct from “ritualization,” doesn’t seem to go away. 
This ambiguity is present for example when the latter notion is first introduced: 
“Ritualization, that is, activities which display fewer of the qualities normally associated with 
ritual.” Normally associated by whom? Also, consider the following: “A ritual is what 
happens when someone notices ordinary ritualization and then compresses, reframes and 
enacts it.” The key word in this just-so story is “reframes,” which is a somewhat circular 
short-hand for “reframes as ritual,” to be understood as that which makes “ordinary 
ritualization” recognizable as an instance of non-ordinary ritual enactment. The question 
remains: Who is doing the noticing and the reframing? The answer would seem to be that it is 
the actors themselves: “ritualization,” says Grimes, “refers to the process of increasing the 
extent to which something is pushed in the direction of socially recognizable ritual.” 
Similarly, Binder, Driver, and Stephenson, while strenuously arguing in their contribution that 
torture is ritualized violence, nonetheless consider that “The principal reason it would be 
awkward to call torture ritual is that there is no cultural understanding of it as ritual.” Thus, 
while “ritualization” is defined theoretically as the greater or lesser presence of particular 
qualities (embodied enactment, spatial and temporal delimitation, prescription, formality, and 
so forth), “ritual” is treated as a local (that is, ethnocentrically grounded) concept whose 
nature and extension vary from one cultural tradition to the next. In short, there is no such 
thing as “ritual” in general. However, I suspect, and Grimes’ own formulations bear witness 
to this, that at least some of the contributors (I count myself among them) are less than 
satisfied with the impoverished, atomistic understanding of ritual that this position implies: 
ritual as a fuzzy set of typical features. Many of them, while espousing, in principle, a family-
resemblance strategy that renders any distinction between “ritual” and “ritualization” 
superfluous, nonetheless hesitate to abandon this discrimination altogether, hence the feeling 
that beneath the surface of the analytical perspective adopted in this volume is the 
unacceptable desire to have one’s ritual cake and eat it too. 
 The difficulty is that the alternative to this position also has its problems. To begin 
with, as Grimes shows, there is a variety of theoretical definitions of ritual to choose from. 
But more importantly, whatever the definition chosen, to the extent that ritual is held to be 
distinct from ritualization, the latter loses its tight connection to the former, regardless of how 
it is locally framed. Ritualization may be regarded as being like ritual, as evocative of ritual, 
as a metaphor for ritual, or what have you, but it is pointedly not ritual. While such a stance 
may be close in spirit to that taken by some of the contributors, it weakens the volume’s 
overall argument considerably.  
Trying to get out of this dilemma is daunting. As I see it, two things are required. On 
the one hand, it is necessary to provide a substantive account of ritual that, while sufficiently 
discriminatory, is able to subsume certain practices that depart significantly from canonical 
ceremonial forms. On the other hand, it is necessary to provide the grounds for an organic link 
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between ritual and ritualization such that ritualization becomes simply the process whereby 
ritual is put into effect. This is fairly close to the approach favoured by Grimes, but entails 
turning his proposal on its head: I’m looking for a conceptual framework in which 
“ritualization” is soluble in a well-defined notion of “ritual” rather than the other way around. 
Let me briefly try to outline in the following two sections what such an upside-down 
framework might be. 
 
Ritual as a Mode of Participation 
 
Ritual, as Grimes remarks, is not a “thing” or even an event, but a way of partaking in an 
event. To springboard off Jonathan Z. Smith into more (inter)action-oriented waters, we might 
say that ritual is a particular way of paying attention to what one is doing (with others).1 It 
thus pertains to the nature of the connection, as experienced by participants, between the 
actions they undertake and their intentional and emotional dispositions. This connection can 
take different forms, each of which may be said to define a particular mode of participation. 
One of these modes of participation, I suggest, is “ritual.” In ritual, participants’ attention is 
focused less on how their actions may be construed as expressing their personal attitudes, 
feelings and beliefs than on how their attitudes, feelings and beliefs may be informed by the 
accomplishment of certain actions.  
 In this perspective, “ritual” is less a category of behaviour than one among several 
possible pragmatic presuppositions that tacitly or explicitly govern peoples’ participation in 
particular events. Another mode of participation is “spectacle” in which, as in ritual, 
participants’ attention is directed at how attitudes, feelings and beliefs are affected by the 
performance of certain actions; however in this case, it is not the performer’s own intentional 
and emotional dispositions, but those of others, which are purported to be affected by the 
actions undertaken. Still another mode is “play,” in which participants’ actions are taken to 
express their personal feelings and motivations, all the while being pursued in conformity 
with what are perceived to be certain out-of-the-ordinary conventions. These different modes 
of participation are often combined in various ways.2 They can be juxtaposed to each other or 
embedded within each other; they can oscillate from one mode to the other, and so forth. 
Indeed, the underlying idea of the model I am proposing is that most empirical events are not 
pure instances of any particular mode, but composite configurations giving rise to distinctive 
emotional, intentional, relational, and esthetic effects. 
 In any given performance, the ritual mode of attention is embraced by those concerned 
to a greater or lesser degree. Not only are some individuals less attentive to what they are 
doing than others, but what is resolutely ritual for some may be intuitively experienced by 
others as spectacle, play or something else entirely. Moreover, an individual’s mode of 
participation may vary in the course of the enactment. At the same time, however, the 
practical exigencies of ongoing coordinated interaction tend to minimize such disparities, 
orienting participants’ perceptual and performative expectations along parallel lines. From 
this point of view, ritual, as one among a number of organizational principles governing the 
perception and patterning of social activity, is best understood a statistical phenomenon not 
unlike a mathematical “attractor”. In other words, ritual is a stable pattern of probabilities in 
the distribution of participants’ attentiveness within a field of possible modes of participation. 
To qualify an enactment as “ritual” or “ritualized” thus amounts to the same thing. It is to 
entertain the hypothesis that the actors participate in this enactment by tacitly or explicitly 
attending to how their personal attitudes, feelings and beliefs may be affected by their 
performance of certain actions. To speak of an event as “a ritual” is to estimate that this 
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pragmatic presupposition is adopted by the participants in such a systematic fashion as to 
approach the theoretical limit of absolute ritualization.  
 We do not have direct access to how people attend to what they are doing. For this 
reason, and in order to avoid basing our analysis on local categorical schemes, analytical 
hypotheses and estimates regarding the ritualistic character of particular events, while fueled 
by the utterances of those involved, are founded on properties of the events themselves. Ritual 
is potentially present in any situation. However, what Don Handelman has called the “design 
features” of certain events favour a ritual mode of participation more readily than others.3 
Among these features is the use of distinctive designations, the evocation of authorities, as 
well as the morphological traits identified by Grimes (spatial and temporal delimitation, 
formality, repetition, etc.). All these features are concomitant qualities of ritual, ones that 
often contribute to the emergence and the persistence of ritual activities, but which are not, 
strictly speaking, definitive criteria.  
Foremost among these design features is the incorporation of a measure of structural 
indeterminacy or complexity that endows lived-through performance with a degree of self-
reference, making it difficult for participants to make sense of what they are doing in other 
than ritual terms, that is, as exceptional enactments, meaningful in and of themselves, whose 
presumed significance is accessible solely by means of their performance. I have argued 
elsewhere  that a privileged wellspring of such complexity is “ritual condensation,” in which 
the simultaneous actualization of nominally contrary forms of relationship gives rise to highly 
evocative items of behaviour that are difficult to account for in terms of everyday 
intentionalities and patterns of relationship.4 This feature is indeed typical of events that 
anthropologists readily recognize as rituals, in which, for example, affirmations of identity are 
at the same time testimonies of difference, displays of authority are also demonstrations of 
subordination, the presence of persons or other beings is at once corroborated and denied, 
secrets are simultaneously dissimulated and revealed, and so forth.  
Recent work on contemporary Western ceremonial however, has prompted me to 
envisage another recurrent source of structural indeterminacy favouring a ritual mode of 
attentiveness. It relates less to the organisation of the actions undertaken than to the definition 
of the agents who undertake them, that is, the participants themselves.5 Taking this further 
design feature into account will allow us to envisage some of the cases in this volume in a 
new light.  
 
Ritual Refraction  
 
Consider the following examples, taken, respectively, from Salomonsen and Danforth: 
 
In the course of her “first blood” ritual, largely designed by one of her 
mother’s friends, Sonia, wearing a long hooded robe and carrying a basket of 
flowers, is led into the centre of a circle formed by the participating women 
dressed in red. Standing close together, they “teach [her] who the Goddess 
actually is” by repeatedly singing: “Listen, listen, listen to my heart’s song; I 
will never forget you, I will never forsake you; I will always love you, I will 
always be with you”. 6 For the participants, I suggest, this performance does 
not so much proceed from their own private feelings and beliefs as it expresses 
the sentiments and convictions of beings (Orphic priestesses? Amerindian 
sagewomen?) deemed wiser and more natural than themselves whose attitudes 
they seek to emulate and whose ceremonial footsteps they do their best to 
follow. However, as the scene ends, each of the participants finds herself to be 
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deeply affected: “For a long time [Sonia] only stares down at her feet. But we 
continue to sing, and after a while she raises her head, as if the spirit moves her 
to a place of strength. She then looks calmly into our eyes, one by one, as she 
slowly turns clockwise in the circle. To watch this shift from shyness to calm 
and conscious eye contact is a moving experience, and some of the women, 
including her mother, start to weep […]”.7 
 
During Ken Cadigan’s firewalking workshop, participants are led through a six 
hour long preparatory process that allows them to get in touch with their inner 
“fire of the heart” and to “be open to who [they] are” so as to be able to 
confront and overcome “fear and limiting beliefs.” This involves praying, 
dancing, chanting, listening to stories and lectures, talking to oneself (“My 
intention is to have a healing experience”), “speaking from the heart” about 
oneself to others, visualizing one’s desires, writing down what one wishes to 
abandon to the fire, etc. Having thus revealed this unsuspected potential within 
themselves, the participants are ready to walk through the fire: “Let the coals 
invite you. Go in when you feel a big ‘yes’ in your heart.” Their doing so is in 
large part upheld by a concerted effort on their part to become “extraordinary,” 
that is, something other than what they usually feel themselves to be. However, 
it is as “ordinary” individuals that they come off the hot coals deeply moved, 
hugging each other and cheering “Yeah! All right! Way to go!”.8 
  
Enactments such as these are predicated less upon ritual condensation than upon what 
we might call “ritual refraction.” The participants’ personal attitudes, feelings and beliefs are 
presumed to be affected by performances that do not consist in the pursuit of conventionally 
stipulated forms of behaviour, but instead follow from an equally conventional emulation of 
what are held to be exemplary emotional and intentional qualities, often ascribed to non-
Western, pre-Christian, or still more exotic others (Native-American shamans, Celtic 
priestesses, Ascended Masters, etc.) or to more authoritative aspects of the participants 
themselves (one’s inner child, one’s spiritual self, the Goddess within, etc.). In other words, 
these rituals are organized less around the performance of archetypal actions, as discussed by 
Humphrey and Laidlaw,9 than around the instantiation of archetypal agencies defined by a set 
axiomatic intentional and emotional dispositions. Correlatively, the potency of these practices 
relates not to the special, mysterious character of the actors’ behaviour, but to the exceptional, 
equally mysterious qualities taken on by the actors themselves. Indeed, ritual enactments such 
as these give rise to enhanced, refracted subjects spanning several contrary identities at once: 
the archetypal agencies the participants seek to emulate and the participants affected by the 
performances deriving from this emulation. The structural uncertainty intrinsic to this 
situation pertains not so much to what exactly is being done – typically, the actions carried out 
are rendered readily intelligible (by analogy for example) in terms of everyday patterns of 
motivation and interaction – as to who exactly is doing it.  
 There are three particularities of identity-refracting ritual enactments that contrast 
markedly with more canonical ceremonial performances. First of all, self-conscious 
innovation and creativity are considered to be a necessary, pivotal feature of such practices, 
essential to their effectiveness. Existing or imagined religious traditions are taken to provide 
not models to follow but resources to be inventively explored with a view to their 
personalization, that is, their adaptation to the peculiarities of the situation at hand and the 
sensibilities of those involved. Thus, the practitioners’ overriding concern is not to replicate 
antecedent ceremonies but rather to recapture, in themselves and in the performances they 
create, the spirit in which such ceremonies are presumed to have been performed.  
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 Secondly, ritual enactments of this type are designed to be reflexive, the participants 
being made to relate to images, utterances, and somatic sensations that participants 
themselves deliberately generate. Such reflexivity is an essential feature that prevents the two 
opposing aspects of the participants’ ritually engendered identities from collapsing into one. 
Thus, without calling their exceptional nature into question, many practitioners insist on the 
metaphorical significance of their performances, and few would maintain, for example, that 
they simply are, unequivocally, an Ascended Master or a Native-American shaman.  
 This reflexivity is also closely connected with a third feature, the extensive use of 
immaterial props or devices. In more classical ceremonial events, ritual relationships among 
participants and between participants and non-human entities are generally, if not always 
mediated by the manipulation of objects whose very physicality provides these difficult-to-
grasp relationships with intention-laden material grounding. Here, however, although objects 
may be involved, the emergence of ritually constructed subjects is often mediated by 
immaterial representations that favour the ambiguities that these refracted identities bring into 
play. “Visualisation” or “creative projection” in which participants are affected by intangible, 
virtual performances largely of their own making, is a prime example of this.10 
 Personalized creativity, self-aware reflexivity, and the prevalence of immaterial 
representations, then, are among the concomitant characteristics of what I suggest is a largely 
under-theorized type of ritual activity.11 As in all instances of ritual, the participants attend to 
how their pursuit of certain behaviours may impact upon their personal feelings, attitudes, and 
beliefs. The behaviours in question, however, rather than standing on their own (as archetypal 
actions), occur as actualizations of exemplary intentional and emotional qualities that are felt 
to be different from those of the individual participants who strive to emulate them. 
Participants are presumed to be affected by performances deriving from their attempt to 
assume these axiomatic qualities. Taking this refractive process into account should allow us 
to appreciate some of the events described in this book not as ritualized in the sense of having 
a number of ritual-like features (spatial and temporal delimitation, formality, repetition, etc.), 
but as enactments governed by the pragmatic presupposition (participants’ dispositions follow 
from their actions) that defines a distinctly ritual mode of participation. To see how this might 
be the case, however, requires saying something about media and mediatization. 
 
Media and Mediatization 
 
“We use ‘mediatization’, says Grimes, to denote the process that includes both construction 
and receiving communications by way of a medium,” the latter being “any means of 
communication that, metaphorically speaking, sits in the middling position thereby linking 
two parties.” At different points in this volume, the contributors grapple with the question 
“What are media?” As the above quotation suggests, the answer is, potentially, just about 
anything, including conflict and ritual activity itself. However, as Grimes and others make 
clear, the type of media that many of the authors are concerned with is what is often called 
“mass-media,” addressed to a public audience: press, radio, television, Internet. Written, 
auditory or visual representations communicated by mass-media, by virtue of the distancing, 
technical processes that govern their production and because of the supposed anonymity of 
those to whom they are addressed, acquire a degree of autonomy with respect to senders and 
receivers. Such representations are capable of marshalling attention, inducing reactions, and 
being exploited in their own right. “Mediatization,” denoting the construction, reception, and 
utilization of widely accessible depersonalized representations, thus goes far beyond the idea 
of information conveyed by a particular means. Rather, it is cultural process geared to the 
production of and response to conventional, exemplary narratives, images, and sounds that do 
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not so much portray the way things are as they propose how things are supposed (in both 
senses) to be, untainted by the entanglements and irrepressible contingencies of personal 
relationships.12  
 Mediatization, as the creation and communication of such representative 
representations, is an increasingly banal feature of our contemporary social life. “For most 
people,” say the authors of chapter 4, “their perception of the world is media-based; their 
reality is media-fed.” It should thus come as no surprise that, as they go on to stress, “media 
representation [is] a powerful factor in identity-making,” and that, in general, people make 
privileged use of mediatized representations as benchmark references for their feelings, 
convictions and behaviour. Indeed, much of the time, most of us, consciously or not, are 
caught up in Alan Klima’s far-reaching question that recalls the culture/nature perplexity 
(how can humans be part of nature and stand apart from it?) that Lévi-Strauss took to be the 
grain of sand around which the pearls of culture are formed: “How could the media be 
divested of ‘real life,’ when the media is, to some extent, our life?”.13 A case in point is 
provided by Grimes’ discussion of “iconic” photographs such as those selected by World 
Press Photo: “An icon is any image that embodies itself in viewers with sufficient power that 
the viewers then echo, if not reproduce it.” Grimes’ use of the liturgically resonant term 
“icon” is no accident, and I would like to follow up on his observation that “ritual and media 
are not necessarily two separate things” by stressing how often mediatized products provide 
the basis for ritual enactments of the type described in the previous section. A number of 
cases analysed by the contributors can be seen as self-affecting performances founded upon 
the emulation of mediatized representations exemplifying what are taken to be axiomatic 
attitudes, feelings and beliefs.  
 In the perspective that I am proposing, the reflexive nature of many mediatized 
artefacts and entities, the fact that their ostensibly contrived nature encourages us to perceive 
ourselves perceiving them, in no way detracts from their aptitude to act as paradigmatic 
references for the organization of ritual events. On the contrary, this quality is consistent with 
what I have argued to be an essential feature of identity-refracting ritual: the unresolved 
tension between the participants as the extraordinary effecting parties and as those personally 
affected by the performances they undertake. This tension is the source of indeterminacy that 
sets such enactments apart from everyday intercourse and allows the participants to 
experience themselves as more than what they seem. The process becomes more circular and 
indeterminate when the mediatized representations concerned are, in part, of the participants’ 
own making. There are a number of examples of this dynamic in the present volume. In such 
cases, the ritual performances in question follow from the reflexive emulation of archetypal 
others that are none other than the participants’ mediatized selves. Ritualization is made to 
exploit the process of mediatization “by which the self recognizes itself by returning to itself, 
renewed and once removed”14 
 I have divided the papers and the eighteen case studies they present into two groups, 
each implying a fairly different type of relationship between ritual and media. In the first 
group, ritual practices are seen as having been transferred to new, mass-mediatized 
performative contexts. In the second, they are shown to interact with mass-media in a variety 
of ways.  
 
Transfers 
 
In many of the examples analysed in this collection, ritual enactments or features pertaining to 
such enactments are drawn from their original, face-to-face context to be used in the creation 
of new types of performances involving the use of new media or contexts of communication. 
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However, we need to distinguish between two quite different sorts of transfers. The one 
translates the enactments in question from one mode of participation to another, thereby 
giving rise to performative events whose purported effectiveness is altered accordingly. The 
other transposes ceremonial enactments to new, more widely accessible, video or on-line 
virtual environments.  
 The first, inter-modal type of transfer is illustrated by the case studies presented by the 
authors of chapter 2. In them, minority group representatives assert both their cultural 
specificity and their collective autonomy by portraying, as artistic spectacles, components 
drawn from ritual enactments that the surrounding, dominant populations attribute to them. In 
Christian Thompson’s commissioned piece I Need You / You Need Me (The Fox), in Garo 
students’ Wangala dancing during the televised annual Indian Republic Day parade, and in 
the young people’s staged performance of Burhdeva at a yearly national heritage festival, 
mediatization plays a peripheral role, acting either as a neutral medium of expression (The 
Fox) and/or ensuring a widespread diffusion of the events. What is at stake is the potentially 
problematic transfer of elements from enactments undertaken as ritual to performances 
founded upon another mode of participation entirely, art or spectacle. Unlike Australian 
Aboriginal initiation rites, Wangala dancing in village-level harvest celebrations and the 
presentations that punctuate pilgrimages of the Jakh and Chandikah deities, the distinctive 
effectiveness of these exhibited events is assumed to reside less in the impact they may have 
on the feelings and beliefs of those who undertake them, than in how they may affect the 
feelings and beliefs of others, namely those who visit the Centre for Contemporary 
Photography’s Black on White photomedia exhibition, those who attend to Republic Day 
festivities, and those who take part in the Virasat national heritage festival.  
 In these cases, features of ritual performances are used to create what are consensually 
treated as artistic ones. Conflict occurs when a ritual mode of engagement is nevertheless 
entertained by some of the participating parties. It is clearly as a publicly mediatized symbol, 
and not as a ritual enactment, that students undertake Wangala dancing to showcase “Garo 
culture” in the Republic Day children’s pageant. Because the non-Christian, poor village 
communities who still practice Wangala as ritual and the Christian, urban elite who perform it 
as spectacle do not overlap (Christians don’t participate in village harvest ceremonies), there 
is little ambiguity and, consequently, little conflict. However, the potential for such conflict, 
as well as the pre-eminence accorded to ritual Wangala is given conventional expression in 
pan-regional Wangala competitions which the villagers always win.  
 The Burhdeva case is less straightforward. When undertaken to honour local deities, 
this event’s undeniable theatrical qualities are subordinated to its supposedly ritual character. 
Night-long performances, entailing stringent sexual and caste-based divisions, need to take 
place whether there is an audience or not. However, when staged by mixed-caste young 
people of both sexes as an artistic display promoting their regional cultural heritage, this ritual 
dimension all but disappears. Conflict arose when some of these young people, to their 
teacher’s alarm, began participating in the Burhdeva play as ritual by drawing attention to 
how they themselves were affected by their performance. It is important to emphasize that this 
short-lived bid for ritual (re)creation, in which the actors became the mouth-pieces for gods 
demanding the exclusion of low-caste dancers, was not a return to usual Burhdeva practice, 
but a novel synthesis, combining the disparaging remarks the deities traditionally address to 
their villagers, the young people’s dissatisfaction with their well-meaning teachers, and the 
latter’s determination to distinguish themselves from customary Burhdeva practitioners. 
 The Fox juxtaposes elements drawn from Australian Aboriginal ceremonial and from 
recent developments in contemporary indigenous art to make an aesthetic statement from the 
artist’s perspective as both an Australian of European descent and as a member of an 
Australian Aboriginal community. Thompson describes his installation, which portrays a man 
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being symbolically transformed into a non-indigenous animal, as a contemporary re-
enactment of a bygone initiation rite. In doing so, he comes up against the perceptions of 
others who, although excluded from such rites, have very different ideas about what they 
should be. Conflict is grounded in the artfully maintained tension between the explicitly 
fanciful content of the work (involving pink lederhosen, stylish pointy-tipped shoes, a long-
nosed “neutral” mask, wide suspenders, and a foxtail) and the circular yet traditionally 
coherent claim that it derives from ritual knowledge whose nature, for ritual reasons (as 
“men’s business”), can not be revealed. In this way, in interesting counterpoint to the 
ambivalent attitude of the White Australian establishment towards Aboriginal people, 
Thompson, not content to both eat and have his profoundly marbled, Black-and-White cake, 
does his best to bed the (Australian) baker as well. The result is a highly provocative, 
somewhat disturbing presentation eliciting conflicting attitudes and understandings among the 
exhibition’s visitors. And this disturbance is precisely what makes Thompson’s installation a 
work of art and not ritual, regardless of what the artist’s personal experience and knowledge 
might be. Art is above all presumed to induce complex emotional and intentional states in 
others.  
 Like many public events, the three artistic spectacles presented by DuBois, de Maaker, 
Polit, and Riphagen are capable of accommodating a ritual mode of participation on the part 
of at least some of their participants. This accommodation is what leads to conflict. However, 
I suggest that participants’ aptitude to do so relies less on the presence of certain 
morphological features shared by ritual and spectacle (embodied enactment, spatial and 
temporal delimitation, formality, etc.) than on the potential these performances offer for ritual 
refraction, that is, the possibility of being moved by actions proceeding from the emulation of 
archetypal convictions and attitudes incarnated by exemplary others: Wangala dancing non 
Christian Garo villagers, Burhdeva performing devotees of Jakh and Chandikah, secret-
keeping Aboriginal initiates. The use of audio and video media plays an important role in the 
creation of such depersonalized, representative entities. Thus, the development of both 
showcased Wangala dancing and staged Burhdeva was largely founded on the study of locally 
made, state-financed documentary videos, and it is no accident that the young people’s 
renewed ritualization of Burhdeva was precipitated not by observing actual customary 
practices but by watching a film of such practices. Likewise, it is significant that the purported 
source of ritual knowledge underlying Thompson’s video installation is an audio tape of his 
deceased Aunt Carrie. 
 The cases described in chapter 6 entail two types of transfer. On the one hand, familiar 
rituals – church services, weddings, and funerals – are transposed to the medium of the 
Internet in which participants interact in a digitally rendered, three-dimensional visual space 
by means of virtual self-representations known as avatars. On the other hand, a degree of 
inter-modal transference is involved as well. Because spaces such as these are often used as 
environments for multi-user role-playing, participation in these on-line ceremonies is as much 
predicated on the presuppositions of play than it is on those of ritual. This makes for a highly 
equivocal situation. Participating in an event as ritual means focusing one’s attention on how 
one’s behaviour may affect one’s feelings and convictions. Participating in an event as play, 
however, means attending, as one does in everyday interaction, to how one’s behaviour may 
be taken to express one’s personal motivations and beliefs, and, at the same time, attending to 
how one’s behaviour is constrained by what are recognized to be unusual conventions (the 
“rules” of play). As one might expect, doing all this at once can pose problems, and it is 
difficult to imagine performing a ritual properly and engaging in good play (not just following 
the rules) simultaneously. Some of this ambiguity can be resolved by encapsulating ritual 
events, assigning their performance to particular niches within the virtual environment where 
the suppositions of play no longer apply. However, conflicts easily arise when encapsulations 
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of this type are not recognized by all concerned, such that the ritual participation of some 
becomes undermined by the play participation of others.  
 The aggressive disruption by rival factions of a memorial service undertaken for a 
deceased team-mate in the online game World of Warcraft offers a clear example. Whereas 
celebrants were committed to what they anticipated, and publicly announced, to be a moving 
(ritual) ceremony for one well-loved, their gaming opponents saw this gathering as a golden 
opportunity to inflict some serious (play) damage on the enemy.  
 The crashing of weddings in Second Life provides another, less obvious example. 
Second Life is a virtual world in which participants can engage in rich social interactions just 
as they are presumed to do in “real life,” but under out-of-the-ordinary conditions. One can 
choose how to appear to others, one can fly, one communicates mainly by typing, and so 
forth. In this respect, although Second Life is pointedly not a game, participation in it remains 
implicitly oriented by the pragmatic presupposition of play. Thus, elaborately orchestrated 
Second Life weddings, involving considerable effort and expense, invariably become the 
object of disturbances by outsiders. Much as in the World of Warcraft example, the intruders 
seem to be motivated by the idea that a play-governed environment is not a legitimate setting 
for serious ritual activity. These disruptive interventions, while upsetting the wedding 
participants’, may also comfort their conviction that what they are enacting is indeed a ritual 
(for if it were not, why would intruders react so negatively to it?). However, they also make 
such performances difficult to pull off, such that persons who wish to get married in Second 
Life are obliged to encapsulate their ceremonial performance still further by restricting access 
to the wedding site to invited guests only.  
 The Church of Fools, a three month-long experimental on-line church constructed 
exclusively for religious worship and modelled on “real-life” church-going, is the most 
ambiguous example. Here, the premises of play were explicitly excluded. In many ways, the 
frequent recourse to stipulated, largely equivocal gestures (such as injunctions to “please use 
‘tear hair out’ gesture as we think of them” or shaking hands with co-participants who are 
invisible to all except themselves), made these on-line services close to what many would 
recognize as canonical ritual behaviour. However, even here, ongoing, coordinated virtual 
ritual became difficult to sustain. The 3D multi-user environment itself, which many users 
associated with on-line role-play, led to the intrusion of numerous disruptive visitors who 
enthusiastically insulted parishioners, misused liturgical gestures, and engaged in parodies of 
worship, upsetting proceedings to the point that increasingly stringent encapsulating measures 
proved necessary.  
 Heidbrink, Miczek, and Radde-Antweiler note that in these examples, conflicts derive 
not from the on-line mediatization of ritual as such but from disparate definitions of the 
virtual space in which they take place. The implication is that ritual and play, when pursued 
simultaneously, are largely incompatible. This incompatibility comes out clearly, for instance, 
in the on-line debates that raged for three years following the funerary massacre in World of 
Warcraft. The solution that consists in isolating ritual within the overall context of play is 
possible, but, as these examples also show, poses ongoing problems. These difficulties arise 
because ritual, predicated as it is on a single, straightforward presupposition (attending to how 
the performance of actions affects the performer’s dispositions), is pragmatically less complex 
than play, such that negotiating a move from a situation of greater to one of lesser complexity 
and back again is not easy. It is indeed no accident that, whereas instances of play or game 
embedded in or framed by ritual are commonplace (initiation rites are typical in this respect), 
the reverse is much harder to come by. The only example that readily comes to mind is when 
young people perform children’s versions of adult rituals as part of (what is seen by adults as) 
conventional play.  
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 One of the questions chapter 6 raises is the status of ritualizing in multi-user virtual 
environments. I argue that the funerals, weddings, and church services in their examples are 
not merely cases of play; however, nor are they merely instances of ritual. They are examples 
of something more subtle and less obvious, rarely found in “real life” but prevalent on-line: 
ritual embedded in play. I am tempted to suggest that it is not so much the recourse to the 
customary trappings of conventional ritual behaviour, as it is the mediatized refraction of 
those who participate in these activities, that contributes to making their ceremonial 
enactments irreducible to mere playing. Participating persons, seated at their computers, are 
involved in creating exemplary, virtual avatars of themselves, defined by archetypal 
dispositions whose emulation leads to enactments (funerals, weddings, church services, etc.) 
whose performance is presumed to affect not the avatars’ emotions and beliefs, but those of 
the persons themselves. The participants, at once their avatars and themselves, are made to 
feel, and to be felt by others, as more than what they ordinarily are. Awareness of the 
ambiguities inherent in such enactments contributes to rather than detracts from their 
effectiveness by helping to maintain the co-presence of one’s different selves. To my mind, 
the widespread development of ludic ritualization as a mode of participation experienced by 
those who pursue it as having value in its own right is a truly innovative development, the 
import of which has only begun to be explored. And therein lays the potential danger of 
encapsulation. If on-line ritual enactments are hermetically sealed off from their 
encompassing play context, ludic ritualizing becomes untenable. One is left with something 
simpler: ritual.  
 On-line rituals that are nothing but rituals are the subject of chapter 5. The authors are 
explicitly concerned with the consequences of a single type of transference: rituals relocated 
to cyberspace. The three examples considered are Internet sites largely devoted to Australian 
Aboriginal smoking ceremonies, the Website of the Marian sanctuary at Lourdes, and 
weblogs created by the dying and the bereaved in the Netherlands.  
 One of the interesting findings of this chapter is that the first two sorts of Websites 
don’t really function well as venues for the ritual enactments they advocate. Smoking 
ceremonies, that consist in holding leafy branches over a fire and then over people, places, 
and objects to the accompaniment of words, song, or commentary, is customarily undertaken 
following death, during initiations, and on other ritual occasions. Smoking has gained 
widespread acceptance as an important public act in Australia for the inauguration of new 
buildings, mines, and civic events. Beyond the purifying effects these ceremonies may have, 
they mediate conflict-laden relations between non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal Australians, 
allowing the former to legitimate their presence on the continent by giving recognition to the 
latter as first occupants of the land. The websites that display and publicize such ceremonies, 
most of which are run by non Aboriginal Australians to promote aspects of Aboriginal 
culture, also provide a variety of resources and testimonials. However they do not include the 
possibility of on-line ritual enactments, and according to the authors, at the present time, 
virtual smoking ceremonies are difficult to imagine.  
 The official Lourdes website is ostensibly intended for those unable to go to the shrine 
itself. It provides useful contact information and practical advice regarding various forms of 
devotion, allows on-line visitors to make a virtual tour of the shrine and access webcam 
images, lets them send a prayer that is burned onto a CD and placed in the Virgin’s grotto, 
and allows them to participate in a forum where they can leave messages and respond to those 
left by others. The highly commercialized, tightly managed, and aseptically reconstructed 
nature of the physical shrine notwithstanding, this on-line experience is apparently no 
substitute for the acts of intimate personal communication that, in spite of the regulations that 
prohibit them, constitute an essential part of what going on a pilgrimage is  about: looking 
into Mary’s eyes, touching her hands and feet, hiding hand-written notes, and entering into 
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physical and emotional relationships with other pilgrims. In short, while virtual pilgrimages 
are possible, they prove to be less than satisfactory.  
 Death and mourning weblogs, on the other hand, are highly successful and a source of 
great comfort and inspiration for their creators and visitors alike. In ongoing diaries and on-
line memorials addressed to a largely anonymous audience, individuals or groups present 
material relating to their personal experiences of illness and bereavement: reflections, 
photographs, videos, poems, songs, and inspirational quotations, often accompanied by 
commentaries explaining the special meaning these items have for the persons concerned. In 
keeping with the spirit displayed by the weblogs’ creators, visitors provide feedback in the 
form of personal testimonies, condolences, comments, and advice for all to see. These sites 
are maintained for several years running, and the idea that weblog authors’ mediatized 
presence might continue to exist after death is an additional source of comfort to them. 
Mourners often continue to address messages and petitions to the deceased, adding further 
entries detailing new events and phases in their lives. 
 Is this kind of weblogging ritual? The authors describe it as such mainly by virtue of 
its repetitive and symbolic character, and because managing such a site provides solace to 
those in distress. Moreover, while the authors stress the creative dimension of this activity in 
which the persons concerned exercise direct control over how they present themselves, the 
degree to which they do so by means of highly conventional images and texts should also be 
noted. However, I would consider such activities as ritual on other grounds. 
 In creating and contributing to weblogs, people are not expressing themselves as they 
would in the context of ordinary face-to-face interaction, any more than an author, for 
example, may be said to be simply expressing him or herself in producing a book or a song. 
Potentially, they are doing something quite different. As Altena, Notermans, and Widlok 
remark, webloggers are creating “a mediatized self-portrait,” a distanced representation of 
themselves that is animated by their feelings about who they experience themselves “really” 
to be. When, in striving to live up to this exemplary self-representation, they engage in what 
are recognized as characteristic actions (maintaining the weblog), the performance of which is 
presumed to have an effect on their personal sentiments and beliefs, they are participating in 
ritual refraction. This ritual process pursued by weblog creators is upheld by the occasional 
cooperation of visitors who, in much the same way, are involved in creating and trying to live 
up to mediatized selves defined by what they consider exemplary qualities such as empathy, 
self-disclosure, and willingness to share. The personally lived-through, yet highly 
conventional type of emotional reverberation that this on-line dynamic sets up affords 
participants with a distinctive, out-of-the-ordinary experience in the light of which they are 
able to reassess their lives. 
 The study of these three types of Internet sites is framed by Altena, Notermans, and 
Widlok’s  interrogation regarding the basis of ritual effectiveness: does it depend mainly on 
qualities of space (as Jonathan Smith would have it) or on the entailments of embodied action 
(as Ronald Grimes has suggested), both of which may be missing from on-line ritualization. 
The answer is that it all depends. Recognizable location, bodily experience, degree of control, 
agency, and situated action all seem to matter. However, I would stress the importance of 
interactive coordination in the effectiveness of on-line ritualization. I suspect that individual-
based on-line rituals, such as lighting a virtual memorial candle, digital prayer and spell-
casting, or electronically mediated soothsaying, are viable forms of on-line ritual. The 
presence and intervention of others (deceased persons, those to whom a prayer or spell is 
addressed, divinatory powers) are almost entirely contained within the individual’s 
performance itself, with the result that a close degree of continuity between on-line and off-
line action (the link between my mouse-click and the candle it lights on-screen) is easy to 
maintain. Problems arise, however, when the synchronization of one’s own behaviour with 
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that of independent others in the pursuit of joint enactments is required. On the one hand, 
when coordination requires the use of virtual representations such as avatars, the situation 
tends to become one not of mere ritual but of ludic ritualization. When, on the other hand, one 
must collaborate with autonomous others directly, the deficits of current on-line environments 
with respect to the bedrock qualities of effective interaction – intentionality, responsiveness, 
adaptation, and personalisation – become glaringly obvious. The weblog case is particularly 
interesting, because it makes use of a ritual process that depends not on the joint performance 
of stipulated actions but on the creative co-construction of refracted agencies. In this case 
technical shortcomings in no way detract from the effectiveness of ritual performance. On-
line virtuality, rather than undermining ritual experience, provides the latter with a privileged 
medium.  
 
Interactions 
 
A number of the chapters in this volume deal not with the transfer of rituals to new media or 
modes of participation (spectacle, play), but with the relationship between ritual enactments 
and mass-mediatization. At one extreme are cases in which canonical ceremonial forms are 
given widespread media coverage, resulting in conflicts organized around minority/majority 
or local/global discriminations. At the other extreme are cases in which media and ritual are 
rendered interdependent to such a degree as to be practically inseparable, conflict itself 
becoming the object of mediatized ritualization. 
 The simplest types of interactions are those in which ritual, media and conflict are seen 
as being connected to each other by external, causal relationships. In the situations described 
in chapter 4 by Langer, Quartier, Simon, Snoek, and Wiegers, for example, media intervenes 
to publicize a secret or little-known ritual: pamphlets are distributed detailing Masonic oaths, 
the Muslim call to prayer (adhān) in European cities becomes the object of radio and 
television broadcasts, Alevi congregation rituals in urban settings receive widespread media 
coverage, and a mass-distributed documentary film is made about evangelical religious 
training in the United States. In each case increased exposure gives rise to controversies in 
which aspects of these ceremonial enactments come up against ideas and values holding sway 
in the larger social environment.  
 The interacting bodies themselves seem fairly clear-cut. The ritual character of the 
performances in question is unambiguous (evangelical summer camp activities, for example, 
include many eminently ritual acts such as, the washing of hands with “the water of the 
Word” or the breaking of labelled cups in the name of Jesus to “release the spirit”). While the 
selective and generalizing effects of mediatization are recognized and discussed by the 
authors, media is envisaged mainly as a means of drawing attention to and transmitting 
heretofore restricted information to a wider audience. Finally, the conflicts occasioned in 
these cases derive from perceived value differences framed by a zero-sum (I-win-you-lose) 
rule as, respectively, a challenge to state and church sovereignty, a bid for Islamic 
ascendancy, a defiance of established orthodoxy, and an attempt at political and moral 
subterfuge. As the authors’ suggest, the issues involved are those typical of minority-majority 
relations in which a local community of celebrants enters into conflict with the dominant 
society that encompasses them.  
 These cases become less simple, however, when one takes into account the fact that 
the ritual – media – conflict arc is circular rather than linear, with media generating conflict 
that brings about changes in the ritual performances themselves. In some cases, the concerned 
parties abandon or alter their rituals to accommodate the dominant value system, thereby 
gaining a measure of their prior invisibility and/or acquiring new bargaining positions. The 
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imprecations accompanying Masonic oaths have been for the most part dropped, and the 
muezzin’s call has been either eliminated or made more discrete. In other cases, changes are 
introduced that make the minority group even more conspicuous. Intensely mediatized 
evangelical campaigns have become commonplace in ever wider arenas of American life, and 
increasingly public Alevi ceremonial has blossomed over the last two decades as a means 
both for advancing political agendas and for reconfiguring and consolidating Alevi identity.  
 In the case of Alevis and perhaps American Evangelicals as well, something 
noteworthy has happened. Mass-media images of ritual enactments on television or on 
Internet sites such as Youtube have become a privileged reference for the determination of 
proper ritual form. This is especially true of recently established Alevi commemoration rituals 
entailing protest marches and ceremonies at martyrs’ graves, enactments that, according to the 
authors, “derived their standardized elements and general layout largely from mediatized 
sources.” Within the context of such self-referential circuits in which ritual behaviour is 
modelled on its own mediatized representation, media becomes an intrinsic feature of ritual 
practice. It intervenes less as a means of conveying information than as a source of 
inspiration, providing celebrants with depersonalized, archetypal ritualists held to embody the 
feelings and motivations to which they aspire. In this way, the very nature of the ceremonies 
undertaken is transformed. They become increasingly dominated by a process of ritual 
refraction in which practitioners’ affecting performances are predicated on exemplary images 
and narrations of their own making. 
 The situations described in chapters 4 and 3, while taking place on different scales, are 
roughly analogous. Whereas the former pertain to a majority population’s adverse reception 
of minority groups’ rituals, the latter are concerned with local ceremonial initiatives and 
global-wide reactions to the “deviant” messages they imply.  
 In one case from chapter 3, largely through the personal initiatives of the revolutionary 
leader Francis Ona, rituals centred on the Virgin Mary, or “Mama Maria,” as she is called 
locally, became an intrinsic aspect of Bougainville Island’s bid for independence from Papua 
New Guinea. Collective prayer, propitiatory rites, pilgrimages and the use of statues and 
rosary beads, transformed a secessionist movement into a holy war and played a major role in 
the resolution of the conflict. Media coverage of these practices, however, sparked 
considerable protest both at the local level by church groups and globally by those who 
objected to the way the Virgin Mary had been made into an object of worship and exploited 
by the Bougainville Revolutionary Army to legitimate violent action.  
 In the other case, Graziano Cecchini, a Roman artist-activist, dissatisfied with the 
city’s cultural politics and with the exorbitant amount of money spent on a “lacklustre” film 
festival, poured blood-red dye into the waters of Rome’s “hallowed” Trevi fountain. The 
extensive mediatization of this “counter-ritualistic” act of protest, which at once revived and 
challenged the fountain’s traditional symbolic associations (the founding of Rome, Anita 
Ekberg’s cinematographic frolicking, visitors tossing coins into the waters for good luck), 
raised wide-scale controversy. While most decried the performance as sacrilegious and 
potentially harmful, others applauded the “rediscovery” of Rome that it occasioned. 
 In the two examples presented by Hermkens and Venbrux, ritual, media, and conflict 
are integrated into tighter, more complex relationships than in most of the other cases. On the 
one hand, they are explicitly framed in terms of prior local conflicts from which the 
controversial ritual enactments arose, such that these small-scale disputes, along with the 
ritual enactments in question, are seen to be projected onto a global arena, prompting people 
from all over the world to position themselves negatively or positively with regard to the 
issues they raised. On the other hand, mediatization is shown to intervene both upstream and 
downstream with respect to the ritual events under consideration. Because these performances 
make use of “global icons,” the Virgin Mary and the Trevi fountain, they become the object 
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of the world-wide media coverage. The circular relationship implied between local and global 
levels goes both ways. The ceremonial appropriation of what the authors call “global ritual 
imagery” allows local conflicts to acquire the status of global events. At the same time, the 
ongoing relevance of such global ritual imagery is corroborated by its use in rituals 
undertaken in response to local conflicts that become the object of widespread mediatization. 
The ritualization of mediatized representations (the Virgin Mary and Trevi fountain) and the 
mediatization of such ritual practices (the Bougainville Revolutionary Army’s Marian 
devotions, Graziano Cecchini’s iconoclastic dye-pouring) go hand in hand, forming self-
reinforcing circuits of meaning and action in which individual initiatives, conventional 
enactments, and collectively held ideas and values become the interdependent aspects of new, 
dynamic totalities. This is the way cultural traditions are begotten and sustained.  
 Consider one of the case studies in chapter 7. In September 2007, in spite of an 
impressive accumulation of auspicious omens (the appearance of white elephants and the 
discovery of large boulders of white jade whereby Buddhas “make themselves known”) 
extensively mediatized by the Burmese Junta to legitimate their regime, the conservative 
order (sangha) of Buddhist monks, accompanied by lay persons, engaged in a ceremonial 
protest by undertaking the ritual called pattam nikujjana kamma. Parading in the streets with 
their alms bowls inverted, they indicated their unwillingness to accept gifts from the 
government, thereby displaying their refusal to give spiritual and moral recognition to the 
ruling Junta. Young men undertook similar counter-ritual practices by baring their chests and 
inviting armed soldiers to shoot, thereby threatening the latter with the possibility of 
engendering vengeful spirits (nats) such as those of persons killed by unjust rulers. This event 
brought about an escalating, violent national crisis, whose images were aired extensively over 
Western media channels until the regime closed down the Internet and stopped news 
transmissions, effectively shutting out the rest of the world. 
 In this case, as in the Bougainville and Trevi examples, rituals undertaken in response 
to a local conflict were given considerable global media coverage which led to international 
expressions of support in favour of the protesters. However, unlike these examples, and closer 
to those described by in chapter 4, the ritual enactments in question were entirely grounded in 
local religious practice. What is striking in this instance is the degree to which recursive 
circuits linking local and global levels and upheld by the interrelationship of ritualization and 
mediatization did not occur. As one might imagine, the absence of such circuits was due not 
only to the fact that the ritual events took place within the context of a local conflict whose 
media coverage was interrupted, but perhaps especially because only “local ritual imagery” 
(that is, of a type unfamiliar to Western viewers) was employed. In this respect, the Burmese 
case stands in stark contrast with another, well-known, extensively mediatized, “local” ritual 
event undertaken in a distant land in response to what was perceived as a global conflict 
making use of a global icon: the Afghanistan Taliban regime’s destruction in 2001 of a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site, the twin Bamiyan Buddha statues (Fig. 9.1). 
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Figure 9.1 The taller Buddha of Bamiyan, UNESCO World Heritage site, before (left picture) 
and after destruction (right) by the Afghanistan Taliban regime.15  
 
 
 Chapter 7’s other case study concerns the pulling down of Sadam Hussein’s statue on 
Firdos Square in Baghdad. Here, globally dominant parties, especially the United States, are 
directly implicated, and ritual practice and media production are interrelated to such a degree 
as to be almost indistinguishable. De Haes, Hüsken, and van der Velde’s detailed analysis 
shows how what was seen by many, especially American television viewers, as a highly 
emblematic ritual event, was largely constructed as such after the fact through the intensive 
use of media representations and techniques such as image selection and framing, 
commentary, and side-barring. Mediatization, in the hands of experts, transformed an off-the-
cuff, partially fumbled attempt by the U.S. military to grandstand a handful of locals engaged 
in throwing shoes at the statue and attempting to smash its concrete base, into an inspiring 
ceremonial performance in which the polarisation of good and evil and the ascendancy of the 
former over the latter were dramatically “revealed” for all the world to see. 
 If ritual is understood in a canonical fashion, as the self-affecting performance of what 
are taken to be archetypal actions, it is plainly abusive to qualify the statue-toppling event, as 
it occurred, as ritual. Indeed, the only ritual act that actually took place was the Iraqi shoe-
throwing. On the other hand, to characterize the media presentation of this event as 
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ritualization means either reducing the latter to a series of recurrent morphological features 
(repetition, formality and so forth), or buying into the ritual-as-polarisation thesis proposed by 
Philip Smith. This is close to the position taken by the authors whose analysis aims to expose 
the procedures whereby truth is systematically distorted and reconfigured so as to marshal 
public support for American interference overseas. Such an interpretation, however, does 
insufficient justice to the subtleties of human agency, at least insofar as the news-makers and 
their audiences are concerned. Whereas the former are made to appear as blatant 
manipulators, the latter are made to appear as mindless sheep. 
 To the extent that ritual is also understood as subject-refracting enactments proceeding 
from the emulation of archetypal dispositions, a somewhat different picture emerges. From 
this point of view, images and narrations pertaining to the event as it occurred acquire value 
not as facts to be accurately conveyed, but as resources for the creative construction of 
distanced, mediatized figures incarnating exemplary sentiments and convictions whose 
emulation provides the basis for self-affecting actions. In this light, it is not the soldiers but 
the news-makers who are engaged in ritual performance. Taking on the sentiments and 
convictions attributed to distanced, mediatized figures partially of their own making 
(oppressed Iraqis, liberating soldiers), leads them to embark on conventionalized activities 
(those of televised media production), the pursuit of which impacts  their own feelings and 
beliefs. News-makers’ undertakings, as actions designed to affect others, are clearly instances 
of ideologically motivated spectacle. At the same time, however, to the extent that the news-
makers themselves may be thought to be personally moved by what they present, their 
performance acquires a ritual quality which is also appreciated by the viewing audience. In 
the same way that the allure of participating in on-line ceremonies derives from the fact that 
they are not instances of mere ritual but of ritual embedded in play, the attraction (one is 
tempted to say the enchantment) of watching televised news reports stems from the fact that 
the latter are not instances of mere spectacle but of ritualized spectacle. It is as the vehicles of 
such complex performances that, as the authors state, “iconic images [in news broadcasts] 
achieve a social status beyond their mere visual representation of fact.” From this standpoint, 
the relationship between news-makers and news-viewers is not unlike that between weblog 
creators and their visitors. 
 Binder, Driver, and Stephenson’s  contribution, the last of the volume, deals with 
political torture, and specifically, with the violent, abusive practices perpetrated by the 
American military at the prisons of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. Their thesis is that 
“Torture is not simply violence but violence that is ritualized.” By this they mean that while 
the practice of torture is not culturally understood as “ritual” and for this reason is not ritual 
per se, it is “similar to ritual proper or the same as ritual in some respects.” Treating torture as 
a ritualized activity, also akin in many regards to theatre or to a deadly game, allows them to 
better foreground its all too often overlooked performative, communicative and symbolic 
entailments. Torture, they convincingly show, is above all a violent, unlawful bid for political 
hegemony, a terrifying demonstration of power for its own sake, played out not only in the 
shadowy confines of torture chambers, but also addressed to wider audiences as a means of 
inculcating submission to authority. While the existence of abuse at Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo Bay, for example, is made known, the exact details and circumstances these 
brutalities remain shrouded in mystery. Relayed by the mass-media as an open secret, 
increasingly picked up as a theme in fictional works, torture is implanted in the public’s 
imagination as a regrettable, yet acceptable, necessity whose undertaking is delegated to law-
defying, quasi-heroic state representatives whose infamous behaviour – unavoidable drudgery 
laced with the exhilaration that comes from total domination – can be at once acknowledged 
and ignored. In this way, the systematic infliction of pain and humiliation upon others 
contributes to the construction of state power in several ways: by spreading fear among those 
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who might oppose it, by providing the unavowable grounds for a secret solidarity among its 
immediate practitioners, and by making tacit accomplices of a general public willing to accept 
the legitimacy of a government whose authority resides in its capacity to act beyond the law. 
 The authors argue that torture is of little practical utility as a means of exacting valid 
information. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of modern torture is the extent to which the abusive 
practices it entails exceed the limits of fruitful interrogation. Victims are punished less for 
what they know than for who they are. This is so because torture’s main purpose lies 
elsewhere, as a demonstration of the state’s absolute ascendancy over the minds and bodies of 
its supposed adversaries. Such a display of power by the state’s representatives strikes fear in 
the hearts of its actual or potential enemies, and attests to the state’s ability to act on the 
behalf of its citizens. At the same time, however, the brutal ferocity and the absurdly tilted 
playing field of torture, the lack of empathy of those who inflict or condone it, and the abject 
suffering and depersonalisation of its victims, constitute torture as an inhuman, transgressive 
act lying beyond the bounds of accepted social norms. As such, the practice of torture cannot 
but call into question the legitimacy of the government forces involved. This is the case not 
only from the “enemy’s” perspective, but also, more significantly, from the point of view of 
the citizens of the torture-practicing regime itself, especially when it lays claim to democratic, 
humanitarian ideals. In short, while providing incontrovertible evidence of state power, 
torture may also act to undermine state authority. In this respect, political torture is highly 
ambiguous. In order to be effective as a basis for affirmations of political hegemony, it 
requires special treatment in which it is both exhibited and obscured.  
 In pre-revolutionary France, as elsewhere in Europe at the time, this special treatment 
consisted in spectacular public exhibitions of legally imposed suffering: exposure, whipping, 
branding, scorching, amputating of parts of the body, dragging the body, drowning in a barrel, 
garrotting, hanging, breaking on the wheel.16 I have argued elsewhere that such relentlessly 
excessive, exaggeratedly elaborate inflictions of pain involved members of the onlooking 
public, less outside observers than full-fledged participants, in a network of contradictory 
relationships whereby their position with respect to those in power was ritually defined.17 The 
greater the suffering imposed by the authorities, the greater the demonstration of the power 
the authorities represent, and the wider the disparity between these authorities and the 
condemned individual. At the same time, the more ferocious the punishment, the more the 
public at once detached itself from the suffering person to join forces with the authorities and 
dissociated itself from the punitive authorities to ally itself with the condemned person. In this 
way, a complex ritual relationship was constructed with respect to the powers-that-be in 
which citizens fully identified themselves with neither  the people suffering nor those who 
caused them to suffer, but, on the rebound as it were, with both at the same time. The strange 
emotional mixture the spectators displayed on such occasions – at once intimidated and 
uninhibited, horrified yet strangely thrilled, at times urging the executioner on and at others 
rising up in revolt against him, alternately cheering at each new atrocity and moved to tears – 
can be understood as the emotional correlate of their paradoxical and inherently unstable 
position as defined by this ceremonial performance. These were ritual events in the usual 
sense of the term, in which the participating public were caught up in stipulated, exceptional 
enactments defying ordinary intelligibility and yet impacting on their personal feelings and 
beliefs. 
Political torture, when undertaken by contemporary, democratic regimes such as in the 
cases of the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay prisons, also requires special treatment 
whereby it can become, as Binder, Driver, and Stephenson suggest, both visible and invisible. 
It too may become the object of ritualization, not in the analogical sense that the authors give 
to this term (as being like ritual in certain ways) but as a performance founded on ritual 
refraction.  
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 As the authors remark, one of the salient features of contemporary political torture is 
the importance of the camera, both as a means of reinforcing the victim’s humiliation and as 
an instrument for the objectification of state power. The images leaked to the media from Abu 
Ghraib are striking in at least two respects. First, they were clearly taken by the torturers for 
their own, collective gratification as they performed for an audience that was none other than 
themselves. Second, they are highly stylized, almost burlesque, portraying torture in a way 
that verges on theatrical performance and brings various religious, artistic, and pornographic 
associations to mind. While attesting to the reality of the abusive, depersonalizing treatment to 
which the prisoners were subjected, these images are at the same time dramatically over-
staged. They contrast sharply, for example, with the quiet, anonymous horror recorded in the 
Wikipedia photograph of detainees upon their arrival at Guantanamo Bay’s Camp X-ray (Fig. 
9.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2 Detainees at Guantanamo Bay’s Camp X-ray.18 
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The Abu Ghraib pictures were produced as “iconic” images by and for the prison guards 
themselves, and their value resides not in their ability to depict torture as it is, but in their 
capacity to capture certain exemplary qualities to which these soldiers-cum-torturers may be 
thought to aspire. The photographs are distanced representations incarnating qualities they 
feel they need to embody: brutal yet fun-loving, heartless yet sexy, far from home yet regular 
folk, fiercely loyal to America yet not naive. To the extent that the prison guards drew on 
these mediatized selves to engage in further staged and photographed performances presumed 
to impact on the way they think and feel, these images may be seen as the artefacts of a 
process of ritual refraction. Split between the exemplary personae they seek to emulate and 
their identities as individuals affected by the enactments occasioned by this emulation, the 
torturing soldiers are made to become, for a time, more than what they ordinarily are. It is 
perhaps regrettable, yet hardly surprising, that it was these mediatized, ritual representations 
of torture, rather than the actual practice of torture itself, which became the privileged basis 
for the American public’s perception of Abu Ghraib. Shocked to recognize themselves in 
appalling images, partly of their own making, they could at the same time take comfort in the 
exceptional, outlandish, symbolic nature of the persons and enactments the photos portray. 
 
 Often the way of research in the social sciences is to proceed less by validating and 
applying general principles to empirical situations than by using empirical material to burst 
out of conceptual conventions in the hope of stumbling upon other ways of thinking. This is 
what the contributors themselves have done with respect to some of their own original 
hypotheses. While apologizing for any distortions I may have introduced in responding to 
their papers, I am grateful having had the opportunity to do a bit of bursting out of my own. In 
proposing notions such as ritual refraction, archetypal dispositions, the emulation of 
mediatized others and selves, I am led to a single conjecture of my own: As ritual 
performances becomes increasingly dominated by processes of identity-refraction in which 
mediatized representations play a central role, we should expect an accentuation of conflict 
and its characteristic tendency towards polarisation.  
 The upside-down perspective on ritual and ritualization that I have tried to outline and 
apply to the material in this collection is, of course, not without problems. One of them, for 
example, concerns the limits of refracting ritual: Where does it end? Should we consider 
reality TV, self-help workshops, Internet weblogging, and other familiar features of current 
Euro-American life to be instances of this type of ritualization? I have no ready answer to this 
question. However, recalling the often encountered assertion that “traditional” societies are 
imbued with ritual, I wonder if, in changing our perspective, we might discover that the same 
holds true for “contemporary” Western culture. Imagine: a ritual-filled society of our very 
own. 
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Approaches, Concepts, edited by Jens Kreinath, Jan Snoek and Michael Stausberg, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 413-
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6. Jone Salomonsen, Enchanted Feminism. Ritual, Gender and Divinity among the Reclaiming Witches of San 
Francisco  (London/New York, Routledge, 2002), 236. 
7
 Jone Salomonsen, Enchanted Feminism. Ritual, Gender and Divinity among the Reclaiming Witches of San 
Francisco , 236. 
8. Loring M. Danforth, Firewalking and Religious Healing: The Anastenaria of Greece and the American 
Firewalking Movement  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 237. 
9. Caroline Humphrey and James Laidlaw, The Archetypal Actions of Ritual: A Theory of Ritual Illustrated by 
the Jain Rite of Worship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).  
10. Sarah M. Pike, New Age and Neopagan Religions in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 
4-9. 
11.Refracting ritual of this type has obvious congruencies with a number of aspects of contemporary Anglo-
American culture, and I have yet to find a full-blown example it in non Western traditions. However, this does 
not, in itself, invalidate treating it as ritual, any more than the fact that elaborate sub-section marriage systems do 
not exist outside of Aboriginal Australia automatically makes them any less instances of kinship. 
12. Marika Moisseeff, “Qu’en est-il du lien entre mythe et fiction: Réflexions à partir de l’ethnographie des 
Aranda (Aborigènes australiens),” Paper presented at the CRAL conference, “The Concept of Fiction: Towards 
an Epistimelogical Break,“ June 15, 2007, Paris. 
13
. Hermkens and Venbrux, in chapter three, quoting Klima. 
14
. Hermkens and Venbrux, in chapter three, quoting Mazzarella. 
15. Taller Bamiyan Buddha statue, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Taller_Buddha_ 
of_Bamiyan_before_and_after_destruction.jpg. 
16. Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). 
17. Michael Houseman "Quelques configurations relationnelles de la douleur", In De la violence II,  edited by 
Françoise Héritier, 77-112, (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1999). 
18. Detainees at Guantanamo Bay’s Camp X-ray, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Camp_x-ray_detainees.jpg. 
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